The New Equal Protection- Substantive Due Process Resurrected Under a New Name by Brenneman, Barbara
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 3 | Number 2 Article 5
1975
The New Equal Protection- Substantive Due
Process Resurrected Under a New Name
Barbara Brenneman
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barbara Brenneman, The New Equal Protection- Substantive Due Process Resurrected Under a New Name, 3 Fordham Urb. L.J. 311
(1975).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol3/iss2/5
THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION-
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RESURRECTED
UNDER A NEW NAME?
A tenant, whose water supply was terminated without notice by
the City of Atlanta Department of Water Works (Department), be-
cause of his landlord's failure to pay an outstanding bill, alleged, in
Davis v. Weir,' that the Department's termination policy, author-
ized by city ordinances,' and the Department's refusal to contract
with the plaintiff until the landlord's debts were paid, violated the
equal protection and due process clauses of the United States Con-
stitution.3
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that
the city ordinances violated the due process clause because they did
1. 328 F. Supp. 317, (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974).
The plaintiff actually sued Paul Weir in his official capacity as General
Manager of the Water Works. However, the action was primarily directed
against the entire Department.
2. In particular, the plaintiff challenged sections 33-129 and 33-130 of
the Code of Ordinances of the City of Atlanta as well as section 7.6.16 of
the Charter and Related Laws of the City of Atlanta. Section 33-129 pro-
vides: "'The manager is required to give three days' notice to the owner
or tenant before cutting off the water supply for nonpayment of bills. This
notice may be served upon the tenant or sent by mail to the last known
address of the owner.'" 497 F.2d at 141 n.2. Section 33-130 provides:
"'Upon failure of any person to pay any water bill, assessment or charge
against any premises within ten days from the date such bill is due, the
manager is authorized to cut off and discontinue the water service until
such bill or charge is paid, and a charge of three dollars ($3.00) will be
made for each cut off. Such charge must be paid before water is again
turned on, unless the manager in his discretion waives such charges.' "Id.
at 142 n.3. In addition, section 7.6.16 provides: "'The mayor and board of
aldermen, or said committee, shall have full power and authority to require
payment in advance for the use or rent of water furnished by them, in or
upon any building, place or premises, and, in case prompt payment shall
not be made, they may shut off the water from such building, place or
premises, and shall not be compelled again to supply said building, place
or premises with water until such arrears, with interest thereon, shall be
fully paid.'" Id.
3. Id. at 142.
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not affirmatively require pretermination notice to the actual con-
sumer.4 However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed, finding a violation of the equal protection clause.' Plaintiff's
complaint alleged that the Department divided those seeking serv-
ice into two categories: applicants whose contemplated service ad-
dress is burdened with a preexisting debt for which the applicant is
not liable, and applicants whose residence is free from such debt.
The Department furnished water to the latter class only, arguing
that this policy expedited the collection of unpaid bills.7 Finding
that the Department's acts constituted state action,8 the court of
appeals determined that the Department's discriminatory rejection
of new applicants failed to pass equal protection standards under
the "rational basis" test.' Because the court invalidated the Depart-
4. Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317, 321-22 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
5. The circuit court in Davis was mainly concerned with the equal
protection question; on appeal the Water Department conceded that due
process demands pretermination notice to the actual user. 497 F.2d at 143.
6. Id. at 144.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 143. Supporting allegations of state action in cases involving
public utility companies or other public services can be difficult. Some
courts consider utilities to be completely private while at the same time
possessing certain powers ordinarily designated to the states. Without
finding literal state action, these courts have refused to apply the four-
teenth amendment. For example, in Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.,
466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973),
the court did not invoke fourteenth amendment safeguards to strike down
the utility's method of expediting collection of debts by terminating serv-
ice. It argued instead that there was no direct aid on the part of the state
which related to termination, and, therefore, no state action. In the recent
case of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S.Ct. 449 (1974), the Court
held that the mere filing of a general tariff by a heavily regulated private
utility with a partial monopoly was not sufficient connection for a finding
of state action. For a further discussion of this problem, see Note,
Constitutional Safeguards For Public Utility Customers: Power To The
People, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 493 (1973).
9. From 1889 to 1918 there were numerous challenges based on equal
protection concerning state economic regulation. See, e.g., Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The majority of these challenges resulted in
the statutes being upheld. See Warren, The Progressiveness of the United
States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 294 (1913). In those cases, the
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ment's application policy by this criterion, it did not consider the
possibility that the right to water service is a fundamental right
under either the due process or equal protection clauses.'0
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has applied a
"rational basis" test" to state statutes dealing with economic or
Court applied what is now known as the traditional "rational basis" test.
See Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and A
Proposal, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 605, 607 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Transition]. From approximately 1918 to 1937, the Court changed its
direction, using this rational basis test to protect the interests of business
and property against discriminatory state action. Id. During this period,
though, the Court preferred to use the rubric of substantive due process,
requiring that legislation be a "fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise
of the police power of the state" in overturning legislation, instead of using
the rational basis test of the equal protection clause. Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). Thus, during this latter period, the rational basis
test placed an increased burden on the state to justify its acts. In 1937 the
Court rejected substantive due process as articulated in Lochner, supra.
See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). It also reverted
to the more burdensome requirements of the old rational basis test under
equal protection. See text accompanying note 14 infra.
10. 497 F.2d at 144.
11. The rational basis test was first used by the Court in its due process
analysis. In the first third of the twentieth century the Court invalidated
many statutes under due process. Before this period, in cases such as
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Court felt that many of the issues
presented were legislative questions. Therefore, it applied the rational
basis test to the statutes in question, and usually found the requisite
relationship between the classifications and the purposes for them. These
cases led critics to argue that the Court was subordinating the rights of
private property once believed to be protected by constitutional guarantees
against legislative interference. See Comment, Judicial Review of Legisla-
tion in the United States and the Doctrine of Vested Rights and of Implied
Limitations of Legislatures, 3 TEXAs L. REV. 1, 6 (1924). In the Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the idea of liberty of contract
was introduced as a check on state legislatures in regulating wage contracts
and labor conditions. Comment, supra at 6. This was a major extension of
the Court's reviewing power. From this idea emanated the eventual due
process rule of reason or expediency as a test of the validity of legislation.
According to decisions such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56
(1905), arbitrary legislative acts were void. Under this test, the state had
to show more than a mere rational basis in order for the Court to uphold
its legislation. Eventually the Lochner philosophy of strict judicial review
1975]
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social matters.'" Under this test, the Court identified the basis for
the classification imposed by the legislation. It then examined the
legislative purposes for enacting the statute. If the government
could justify the statute by showing a rational relationship between
the classification in question and the statute's purpose, then the
legislation would be upheld.'3 Since a rational basis could be found
in most instances, the potential for use of the equal protection
clause became almost nil in such cases. '
Greater problems arose with legislation infringing on civil rights.
For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,'5 the
Court was faced with a statute permitting sterilization of certain
types of felons. Justice Douglas found procreation to be a basic civil
right, demanding "strict scrutiny of the classification."' 6 A mere
showing of a rational-relationship by the state was not enough.' 7
Thereafter, this form of strict review was, invoked when the Court
found that the relevant statute affected a fundamental right'" or
in economic substantive due process cases was rejected by the Court in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) and West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). However, this rejection was more like an
about-face by the Court because it went from strict judicial due process
rational basis review to almost none at all. This milder use of the rational
basis test became the same test that was applied to economic and social
matters under the equal protection clause. See Goodpaster, The Constitu-
tion and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 479, 485-86 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Goodpaster, Fundamental Rights]. See also note 9
supra.
12. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding Cali-
fornia constitutional provisions requiring local referendum before low rent
housing could be built); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (up-
holding a Maryland statute placing a ceiling on funds payable to a single
family under Aid to Families With Dependent Children).
13. Transition 607.
14. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); James v. Val-
tierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970);
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
15. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
16. Id. at 541.
17. Id. One writer felt that this new strict scrutiny test was "conceived
in the vacuum left by the Court's rejection of substantive due process
. ... " Transition 609.
18. Decisions subsequent to Skinner which have denominated individ-
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suspect category. 9 Using this standard, statutes were invalidated
unless found to promote a compelling state interest."°
These two standards, the strict scrutiny and rational basis tests,
constituted the "two-tier" equal protection approach.', Under this
analysis, the Court's resolution of the equal protection question de-
pended upon the nature of the legislation involved.
After the creation and use of the "two-tier" test, it soon became
clear that the Court was hesitant to increase its expanding list of
fundamental rights." This relegated important interests to the tra-
ditional rational basis standard and almost certain validation of the
statute under attack. 3 Therefore, a new trend was established by
recent decisions 4 such as Reed v. Reed.25
Reed involved an Idaho statute which gave preference to males
in the appointment of a personal representative." Without holding
sex to be suspect, the Court found the statute unconstitutionalY
The Court thus made it evident that it was willing to invalidate
ual rights as fundamental include Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)
(the right to vote); Kramer v. Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (the
right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the right to
travel).
19. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin).
20. Transition 610-11.
21. Id. at 611.
22. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing not a
fundamental right); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (wealth not a
suspect classification); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (having
large families not a fundmental right).
23. Transition 612.
24. See, e.g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
25. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The more recent use of the equal protection
standard has been described as having a "new bite." See Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv.
1, 18-19 (1972).
26. 404 U.S. at 71.
27. Id. at 75.
1975]
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statutes without creating new fundatmental rights. Under this new
use of the traditional rational basis test, an affirmative burden is
placed upon the state to justify the particular classification in-
cluded in the statute."
In Davis v. Weir, the court of appeals attacked the equal protec-
tion problem in a Reed-like manner, stating:
The City has no valid governmental interest in securing revenue from inno-
cent applicants who are forced to honor the obligations of another or face
constructive eviction from their homes for lack of an essential to exist-
ence-water.2 '
The court in Davis found a general obligation imposed upon the
Department to supply water.30 A departure from this obligation re-
quired the state to show something more than it would have been
required to show under the traditional rational basis analysis."
Basing its equal protection analysis on the existence of a duty by
the Department to supply water as "an absolute necessity of life," 3
28. Id. at 77.
29. 497 F.2d at 145.
30. This general obligation to supply water in Davis follows the Reed
decision because in Reed, although sex was not held to be suspect, it was
deemed important enough to invalidate the statute. Thus the Court in
Reed found a general obligation by the states to treat the sexes alike. 404
U.S. at 75; see Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.
1971), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). The basis for the new
equal protection test can be found in an older case, Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), cited in Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d at 144.
"[A] classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike." 253 U.S. at 415. Having to show a substantial
relationship between the classification and its purpose, rather than any
relationship, is clearly more burdensome. See generally 2 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 587 (1974).
31. See Gunther, supra note 25, at 18-19.
32. 328 F. Supp. at 321. Both the district court and court of appeals
emphasized the importance of water service. Because of this importance
the district court required the Department to notify the tenant: "There can
be no serious doubt that water is an absolute necessity of life. The City of
Atlanta, through the Department of Water Works, has undertaken to pro-
vide this important necessity to the people of Atlanta . . . .The crucial
factor in the instant case is that the effect of the collection procedure is to
terminate an important benefit provided by a governmental agency (albeit
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the court may have influenced not only its equal protection analysis,
but its due process argument as well.
Section 33-129 of Atlanta's 1965 Code of Ordinances requires that
notice of termination be sent by the Department to either the land-
lord, the owner, or the tenant of the building." While it was the
tenant who was most immediately affected by termination of water
service, the district court held that plaintiff tenant had received no
such notification.34 Therefore, an issue arose as to whether the De-
partment's termination policy afforded the actual users due process
of law.3 5
In applying the due process clause to government procedures,
early courts distinguished between individual property rights and
government-bestowed privileges .3 Full procedural due process was
afforded to the former but not to the latter.31 Since this distinction
was first used by the courts,38 the list of rights has grown to encom-
pass many interests which previously may have been considered to
at cost to the customer) without notice to the person who is the actual
recipient of that benefit and who is the person who will suffer a serious loss
without that benefit." Id. at 321-22.
33. 497 F.2d at 142.
34. 328 F. Supp. at 320.
35. Id.
36. Examples of such interests are Social Security benefits, unemploy-
ment compensation, aid to dependant children, veterans benefits, and the
whole scheme of state and local welfare. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733, 734 (1964).
37. See Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA.
L. REV. 691 (1938). Philbrick points out that "property" no longer implies
something physical and tangible. Many other interests, such as the right
to contract, are included in the definition of property. Id. at 694.
38. This distinction between constitutionally protected rights of pri-
vate citizens and unprotected governmental privileges was first applied by
Justice Holmes, while sitting on the Massachusetts high court, in McAu-
liffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). There,
a policeman violated a regulation by engaging in various political activi-
ties. Instead of reinstating his job through the due process protection of the
first amendment's right to free speech and assembly, the court said that
"the petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
1975]
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be privileges. 9 Thus there has been a gradual wearing down of this
right-privilege dichotomy."
Goldberg v. Kelly4' added welfare benefits to the growing list of
procedurally protected rights. In Goldberg, welfare payments had
been terminated before the recipient had an opportunity to prove
that he still met all requirements necessary to receive the aid.4 The
Court rejected the argument that welfare benefits are a privilege
rather than a right.43 Thus, procedural due process was invoked. In
determining the due process question, the Court balanced the im-
portance of an individual's interest in obtaining welfare against the
need for the state to avoid unnecessary payments.4 In recognizing
the overriding importance of welfare, the Court found that the recip-
ient's interest had greater weight. 5
Although utility services have never been deemed "fundamen-
39. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (disqualification for unemploy-
ment compensation); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (denial of tax
exemption); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956)
(discharge from public employment).
40. In Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1971), a Connecti-
cut state procedure authorizing summary prejudgment garnishment was
questioned. The Court stated: "Such difficulties indicate that the dichot-
omy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property
does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property with-
out unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to
travel, is in truth a 'personal' right, whether the 'property' in question be
a welfare check, a home, or a savings account." Id. at 552.
41. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
42. Id. at 259.
43. Id. at 262.
44. Id. at 261.
45. The Court in Goldberg stated: "For qualified recipients, welfare
provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical
care. . . .Thus the crucial factor in this context-a factor not present in
the case of the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged govern-
ment employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtually anyone
else whose governmental entitlements are ended-is that termination of
aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits." Id.
at 264 (footnote and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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tal," they are now recognized to be important rights which cannot
be arbitrarily terminated." When a person's service is threatened,
full due process protection will protect him from arbitrary termina-
tion. There was no need to reach the fundamental right issue in
Davis. A balancing test was particularly appropriate to fix plain-
tiff's due process rights and defendant's due process obligations.47
Several factors were involved in the court's analysis. First, it rec-
ognized the inherent injustice of requiring the tenant to pay all
outstanding bills and of imposing on him the burden of seeking
reimbursement from the landlord in another action." As the court
stated, this procedure amounted to nothing less than "condemning
Davis to pay the past debt of another before he is allowed to contract
for water service."49 In addition, a due process right having been
established,50 the court held that notification to the tenant had to
be given by the utility company.5
46. See, e.g., Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). There, the tenant was threatened by termination of both
gas and electric services. The court recognized the importance of these
services in stating: "It is beyond doubt that electric service can become as
vital to the existence and livelihood of an individual as a driver's license
or welfare check; indeed, it has been held on several occasions that when
termination of such service is threatened the same constitutional safe-
guards apply." Id. at 447. See also Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp.
717, 719-20 (D. Kan. 1972): "It is not open to question that food, clothing
and shelter are considered necessary to sustain life. However, unheated
shelter affects life itself."
47. 328 F. Supp. at 321-22.
48. This is a good illustration of the court's recognition that there are
substantive due process elements in the case. As stated in note 11 supra,
the Supreme Court abandoned most of its use of the substantive due
process analysis. However, it would be unrealistic to think that procedural
due process could exist without its substantive counterpart. If the "due
process" clause requires only fair procedure, then it becomes illusory. Any
arbitrary law would remain valid so long as procedural due process is
afforded. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
49. 497 F.2d at 145.
50. The court in Davis felt that the debts involved represented a minis-
cule part of the Department's revenue. Id. Furthermore, in light of the
availability of other collection methods, the Department did not establish
sufficient need for maintaining its current procedures. Id.
51. In Davis, the court felt that a hearing on the merits concerning the
1975]
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There are elements common to both due process and equal protec-
tion analysis." Once it is determined that equal protection stan-
dards apply, the question that remains is what protection is equal?"
Fundamental interests will merit the highest degree of equality
among the various classifications contained in the statute, thus re-
sulting in a greater possibility that the classification will be struck
down. On the other hand, lesser social and economic interests re-
quire a lesser degree of equality. The various interests which fall
somewhere between fundamental rights and economic and social
matters will invoke different standards depending upon their im-
portance.54 The overlap between due process and equal protection
can be seen in two recent Supreme Court cases: Eisenstadt v.
Baird55 and Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.11
In Eisenstadt, a Massachusetts statute which prohibited the sale
tenant's alleged debts was unnecessary because there was no question that
the landlord was the guilty party. Id. Although there was no question of
liability, there was a question surrounding the plaintiff's loss of water
service, which was not dealt with either by the district court or the court
of appeals. By the termination of his water service the tenant was facing
constructive eviction without a hearing. This is the same as losing a right
or status without due process of law. See Note, The Emerging Constitu-
tional Issues in Public Utility Consumer Law, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 744, 757
(1972). As stated in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), concerning the
right to a hearing prior to any repossession of property: "If the right to
notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must
be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented." Id. at
81.
52. See Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process
Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA
L. REv. 223, 248 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goodpaster, Integration]. It
has also been noted that recent decisions in the area of equal protection
seem to overlap with notions of due process. See Transition 623. More
specifically, once it is determined that an equal protection standard ap-
plies, the court then must determine the degree of equality to be applied
according to the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
53. Goodpaster, Integration 243.
54. Transition 626-27. An interest's importance is determined by its
relationship to notions of valued civil and property rights-rights which
are ultimately protected by procedural due process. Id.
55. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
56. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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of contraceptives to unmarried persons was challenged. 7 The Court
placed a heavy burden on the state to justify its distinction between
married and unmarried persons in the sale of birth control devices.5"
To determine the importance of the need to purchase contracep-
tives, the Court analyzed its relationship to the individual's funda-
mental right of privacy.59 With a showing that the right of privacy
was involved, the Court in Eisenstadt could have invalidated the
Massachusetts statute under a due process balancing test, perhaps
requiring the state to establish a compelling state interest. However,
the Court resorted to the equal protection standard. It examined all
possible purposes behind the statute to determine whether there
was any rational relationship between these purposes and the classi-
fication.10 With as important a right involved as the right of privacy,
a high standard of equality was applied, and the statute was invali-
dated. "
I
In LaFleur,82 the majority invoked a due process standard rather
than equal protection. The case involved a public school policy
requiring all pregnant teachers to take a leave of absence at the end
of their fifth month of pregnancy. Teachers were not permitted to
return to work until the next regular semester. 3
The Court in LaFleur held that these requirements failed to meet
due process standards, primarily because they arbitrarily impaired
57. 405 U.S. at 440-41.
58. Id. at 450-53.
59. Id. at 445-46. The fundamental right of privacy was first enunciated
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court in Eisenstadt
referred to Griswold in its decision: "If under Griswold the distribution of
contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribu-
tion to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that
in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relation-
ship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 405 U.S. at 453
(emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 454.
61. Id. at 454-55.
62. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
63. Id. at 634-35.
1975]
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the fundamental right to bear children." Justice Powell wrote a
concurring opinion where he, like the lower court, felt that an equal
protection analysis was more appropriate.65 In his opinion, Justice
Powell used the new rational basis test.6" Finding no relationship
between the state's reasons for its policy and its mode of classifica-
tion, the state could not sufficiently justify this particular policy. 7
Justice Powell applied a higher standard of equality in his analysis,
implying that important rights were involved.68 The importance of
these rights was also the major factor in the majority's due process
analysis.
If LaFleur is considered with other recent cases such as Eisenstadt
and Dandridge v. Williams,69 certain problems with due process and
equal protection analyses become apparent. Courts must often deal
with issues concerning interests which are not quite fundamental
rights but at the same time are not economic or social interests
either. Thus, an unpredictable standard is invoked which varies
with the importance of the right involved."0 It is the court which
ultimately determines the importance of the right. In Eisenstadt
important interests were at stake. The lower court7 ruled that the
statute violated fundamental rights protected by the due process
64. Id. at 639-43.
65. Id. at 651 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. Male teachers, as opposed to females, did not need to comply with
these regulations imposed by the board of education. Therefore their jobs
were not put in jeopardy. Id. at 652-53.
67. Justice Powell in LaFleur stated: "To be sure, the boards have a
legitimate and important interest in fostering continuity of teaching. And,
even a normal pregnancy may at some point jeopardize that interest.
But the classifications chosen by these boards, so far as we have been
shown, are either contraproductive or irrationally overinclusive even with
regard to this significant, nonillusory goal." Id. at 653.
68. Note that the concurring opinion rejected the notion that the fun-
damental right to bear children was impaired by the school regulations.
Justice Powell saw no need to invalidate these rules on such broad terms.
Many types of statutes could interfere indirectly with child bearing and
yet remain constitutional. Id. For example, limitations on welfare benefits
a family may receive place a deterrence to large families. See, e.g.,
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
69. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
70. Goodpaster, Fundamental Rights 517.
71. Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970).
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clause of the fourteenth amendment.72 On appeal the Supreme
Court applied an equal protection standard, perhaps purposely
avoiding the fundamental right argument.
The Court in Dandridge v. Williams73 was even less reluctant to
find a fundamental right even though an essential one, welfare pay-
ments, was involved. Dandridge dealt with Maryland's program
under Federal Aid to Families With Dependent Children.74 This
program placed a ceiling on funds payable to a single family. The
appellees' argument that the program denied equal protection to
children in large families" was rejected by the court."
Holding a right to be fundamental has long-range consequences.77
It would appear that the Court has, therefore, created a compromise
by using the rational basis test in the new, Reed-like manner." In
some ways, this new equal protection test which overlaps with the
due process notion of weighing and balancing interests against state
objectives seems vaguely reminiscent of the days of substantive due
72. Id. at 1402.
73. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
74. Id. at 473. The State of Maryland participated in the AFDC pro-
gram by statute. According to this statute (MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, §44A
(1969)), each family's need for welfare aid was determined by the number
of children in the family and other extenuating circumstances. Usually the
need increases with each additional member of the family. However, the
Maryland regulation also placed a maximum limit on the amount a family
could receive. 397 U.S. at 473-74.
75. Id. at 474-75.
76. Id. at 477-78.
77. "Holding a right to be a fundamental right has very serious conse-
quences. Since the meaning of most rights is not unequivocal and 'right'
is a general term encompassing a broad range of protected interests, there
is a danger that holding a right to be fundamental will overvalue some
interests. If this happens, legislatures may be proscribed from acting where
they would ordinarily be found justified to act. To avoid this result, the
Court may be forced to refine the 'fundamental' in a given fundamental
right or to move from a compelling state interest to a balancing test. On
the other hand, with respect to the rational basis test, when a sympathetic
Court reviews legislation affecting an important right or interest not
deemed fundamental, it may redefine its notions of rationality to fit the
case. The meaning of 'rational basis' may then become fluid and
unreliable." Goodpastpr, Fundamental Rights 503.
78. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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process, whereby any statutes deemed arbitrary by the Court were
invalidated."9 Like the new rational basis test, the end result in
substantive due process analysis was unpredictable."0 The Court
applied its own particular prejudices to the case in deciding whether
due process was violated or not. It has been noted that this type of
analysis establishes the Court as a superlegislature.8 '
If substantive due process has really returned under a new name,
"the new rational basis equal protection test," Roe v. Wade 2 be-
comes particularly relevant. Roe concerned the right of a woman to
obtain an abortion without state interference. 3 The Court conceded
the legitimacy of what it deemed to be the state's interest in the
protection of the fetus' potential life.84 It also conceded that there
was a rational basis between the anti-abortion legislation and these
state interests.8 5 Nevertheless, the Court found that the right of
privacy was involved and therefore a compelling state interest test
was invoked.86 It held, then, that a state cannot interfere with a
woman's decision to abort in the first two trimesters of her preg-
nancy, invalidating the Texas statute in question. 7
Besides disagreeing with the result, Justice Rehnquist, in his dis-
sent, 8 argued that the Court was reverting to its former due process
notions.8 9 Even worse, he reasoned, these outdated notions were
being used under an equal protection analysis, confusing the equal
79. See note 11 supra.
80. Id.
81. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), where the Court
expressly rejected substantive due process. Justice Black, writing for the
Court, stated: "We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom
of legislation,' and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when
courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws, regulatory
of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, im-
provident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.'" Id. at
731-32 (footnotes omitted).
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. Id. at 116.
84. Id. at 148-50.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 154-56.
87. Id. at 164.
88. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 174.
[Vol. III
NOTES
protection and due process areas even more than before.'"
Davis is a good illustration of a court's use of the new equal
protection standard. If this new test is a sort of revived substantive
due process test, then Davis is also a good illustration of late twen-
tieth century due process analysis.
Whether substantive due process is actually back to haunt us is
questionable. One commentator has stated that "the post-1937
Court has sought to limit the fourteenth amendment due process
clause to a device for protecting against state infringement the
political and religious liberties secured from federal abridgment by
the first amendment."'" He has concluded that the Court is really
not moving back to the type of substantive due process voiced in
cases like Lochner.2 Rather, he sees the Court using equal protec-
tion and due process analysis as a means of allocating roles among
90. "But the Court adds a new wrinkle to this [compelling state
interest] test by transposing it from the legal considerations associated
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Unless I misapprehend the consequences of this transplanting of the 'com-
pelling state interest test,' the Court's opinion will accomplish the seem-
ingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused than it
found it." Id. at 173. In a more recent case, Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628 (1974), Justice Rehnquist also dissented from the majority opin-
ion, based on problems similar to those he found in Roe. In Jimenez, social
security disability benefits were denied to the petitioner's two illegitimate
children born after he became disabled. The state justified this policy,
citing Dandridge, as a way to avoid spurious claims. Id. at 632-33. Instead
of emphasizing the suspect nature of the classification based on
illegitimacy, the Court was more concerned with the subclassifications of
illegitimacy created by the statute. Illegitimates born prior to the disabil-
ity were treated differently than those born after it. Id. at 634-36. In his
dissent, Justice Rehnquist felt that the majority opinion had strong sub-
stantive due process overtones, id. at 638-39, and stated: "This Court
should not invalidate such classifications simply out of a preference for
different classifications or because an unworkable system of individualized
consideration would theoretically be more perfect." Id. at 640.
91. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8
(1973); see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 234 (1957); Cantwell v. Connect-
icut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
92. See Tribe, supra note 91, at 9-10.
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the various elements of government and society in accord with the
Constitution .3
Roe v. Wade is a good example of this role-allocation. The Court
in Roe was not choosing between the two substantive ends: abortion
or continued pregnancy for all women."4 Rather the Court was deter-
mining who should make the decision of abortion or continued preg-
nancy from alternative possible decision-makers such as the state,
doctors, or the individual." Therefore, the Court avoided making a
value judgment as to whether abortion is right or wrong."
Once the Court gets away from analyzing cases according to the
substantive interests involved and gets into the question of who is
to choose among these interests, it is no longer advocating a
Lochner-type doctrine. 7 If this is substantive due process revived in
a different sense, then the Court may simply continue to call it
equal protection in cases involving classes of persons and due pro-
cess in cases involving individuals. 8
The court of appeal's decision in Davis is consistent with this role-
allocation theory. The right to water and the right to contract indi-
vidually are not in and of themselves fundamental. However, fair-
ness requires that the termination policy of the Department be used
as a last resort, after first notifying the plaintiff and allowing him
to remedy the situation.
The role of deciding the right of the plaintiff to contract with the
Department should not rest solely with the Department. In light of
the important interests at stake and the minor burden sustained by
the Department, the plaintiff should be able to choose whether to
contract individually.
Barbara Brenneman
93. Id. at 52.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 12-13.
98. "With respect to fairness concerns underlying the principles of due
process and equal protection, there is, I think, little difference between the
guarantees of equal protection and due process except that the latter deals
with individual fairness while the former deals with fairness as between
groups." Goodpaster, Fundamental Rights 512.
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